Is airline price dispersion the result of careful planning or competitive forces? by Kathy J. Hayes & Leola B. Ross
Is Airline Price Dispersion the Result of








Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) Is Airline Price  Dispersion  the  Result  of
Careful  Planning  or Competitive  Forces?
bv
Kathy  J. Hayes
Department  of Economics
Southern  Methodist  University
Dallas,  TX 75275-0496
(214)  768-2714
(214) 768-1821  (fa>t)
and
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Dallas
Research  Department
Dallas,  TX 75265-5906
and
Leola  B. Ross'
Department  of Economics
Brewster  Building
East  Carolina  University
Greenville,  NC 27858-4353
(919)  328-4165
(919)  328-6743  (fax)
April 1996
* The authors  appreciate  prograrnming  assistance  ftom John  Bishop,  David Welch  and Buhong  Zheng
and  helpfirl mmments  from Richard  Bufler, Yasuji Otsuk4 and Steve  Schmidt  at the 1995  Southern
Economics Association Annual Meetings, and ftom Ju{hin  Huang  and  participants  at an ECU
seminar. Ro6s  is gratefrrl  to the Transportation  Research  Board's Grad VII Award Program  for fna.ncial
support. Th€ views expressed  in this article are solely  those  ofthe authors  and should  not be attributed  to
the Federal  Reserve  Bank ofDallas or to the Federal  Reserve  System.Ab6tract
Price dispersion  can  be explained  by monopoly  power and  be labeled  price discrimination.
However,  fare  wars,  which  also  create  high  varianc€s  in prices,  zuggest  a failed  att€rnpt  arnong
the major carriers  to collude  tacitly. We find no conclusive  evidence  that price dispersion
during  the early  1990s  is the result  of pric€  discrimination.  Moreover,  price  dispersion  is most
closely  associated  with a lower rrerage price, $rongly zuggesting  that competition  forces
prices  down  rather  than  market  power  b€ing  used  to oeloit inelastic  demand.
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Introduction
The  persistence  offare wars  in the domestic  airline  industry  has  captured  the attention
of economists  and  travelers  elike. Appropriately,  colrs;mers  have  leamed  to plan  in advance
and  postpone  ticket purchases  in anticipation  of the next  price  drop. While higttly  publicized
frre wars  signifr  a dramatic  drop  in the  "typical"  price  ofa ticket,  discounted  fares  omasiorully
may  be  formd  in the absence  of a publicized  fare  war. The  proliferation  of zuch  pricing  policies
arrrcng  the m4ior  carriers  continues  to bafle economists.  After accounting  for differences  in
costs, zuch dispersion  could be e*rplained  by  monopoly power and be labeled  price
discrimination.  Howwer, frre wars,  which  also  oeate  high  varianc€s  in prices,  suggest  a failed
attempt  among  the m4ior  carriers  to mllude tacitly. The  coocistence  of these  two theoretical
explanations  suggests  a paradox  within the airline  industry. If price  dispenion  is the re€ult  of
market  power,  then  it is a carefirtly  plarmed  scheme  to extract  cons.rmer  urplus from  travelers.
If fare  wars  are  t}e culprit,  t}en price dispersion  emhdies the fragility of collusive  behavior
and the absence  of marka power.  Unraveling  the deterrninants  of price dispersion  is a
nec€ssary  step in understanding  the balance  (or imbalance)  of power in this industry  and
waluating  the relevance  of market  sfiuctre to market  power.  This study  ortends  previous
work  to  investigate  the dichotomous  origins of  price dispersion. We distinguish  and
characterize  markets  where  there  is martet  power  and  price  discrimination  from those  markets
where  oligopolistic  competition  has  eroded  efforts  to collude  tacitly.
The airline  market's  price  dispersion  literature  was initiated  by Borenstein  and  Rose
(1994) who made  several  valuable  contributions.2  The current  study  contributes  to severaL
aspects  oftlis  literature.  First,  as  compared  to other  studies,  our data  is more  recent  and  more
comprehensivg  possibly  enabling  us to distinguish  the characteristics  of competitive  and  non-
competitive  markets.  During  our sample  period the  early  l990g fare  wars  proliferated  and  the
2  There  was  also  a heuristic  discussion  ofairline price  dispersion  in lott and  Roberts  (1991).  There  have
been  numerous  price  dispersion  studies  for other  industries  such  as  retail  gasoline  by  Borenstein  (1991)
and  Shepard  (1991).Hayes  and Rossl  Page  2
financial  difficulties  of the pass€nger  air{ine  industry  escalated.  These  new malket  corditions
allow us to rescamine  the factors  that lead  to a competitive  or non-mmpetitive  market. As
s.rclr,  we do not expect  the  evidence  reported  in earlier  work of market  power  leading  to price
discrimination  to be replicated  in our sample. Specifically,  our price and enplanement  data
sparn  from 1990Q1  through  lW2Q4.3 Qurterly and  route  variation  is considered  in addition
to carrier  effects,  cost  differenc€s,  and  peak  load  price  effects.
Second  in contrast  to earlier  sfrdies,  we  verify  the  robustness  ofour results  by defining
price  dispersion  under  three  alternative  dednitions.  The  dispersion  indices  we use  have  unique
properties  that provide ditrerent information about disposion wtrile maintaining  similar
rankings.  While  the Gini Coefficient  is probably  the  most  well-known  ofthe dispersion  indices
and  has  several  attractive  properties,  it is only one of many  indices  that have  been  used  to
meas:re  dispersion  in the inequality  literature. kr addition  to the Gini, our analysis  includes
both the Atkinson and the entropy  indices  of i"equulity. We chose  to utilize these  three
meas{res  not to compaxe  their appropriateness  but ralher  to illustrate  tlut  statistical  resrlts
mnsistent  over  all measures  are  more  credible  than  those  that  are  not. Thereforg  those  resrlts
emphasized  in this  sudy are  not sensitive  to the  measr:re  or the  time  period  used.
Third, we expand  the scope  of analysrs  by irrcluding  snaller airports. Moreover,
geographical  regions  with multiple  airports  are identifed to assess  the impact of regional
competition  on price  dispersion  Because  the sample  includes  more  airports  and  spans  sweral
time periodq we are able  to more effectively  isolate  the importance  of rnarket  power and
competitive  foroes.
This research  demonstrates  that price dispersion  in the airline  industry  is a resuh  of
lively competition  which  forces  carriers  to dismunt  fares  below  the desired  level. We do not
find sfstnntial widence of price discriminatio4  alowing the caniers  to odract consumer
srplus. We $spect that,  as  much  as  the  airlines  attunpt to hold  prices  above  t}e competitive
level,  there  is insrficient market  power  to srccessfully  srstain  such  prices. The outcome  of
tlris behavior  may  be similar  to an  Edgeworth  cycle.a  Finally,  our res.rlts  regarding  peak  load
and  cost  differences  $ggest  that  they  do not have  a definitive  impac-t  on disp€rsion
lnris  is in comporison  to the  om qusrter  of rhh Aom 1986  used  in BortnsFin and  Rose.
"  See  Slade  (1989)  or Maskin ad  Tirole (lgEE).Htyes and Rossl  PageS
In the noct sectior\  we discus various  sources  of price  dispersion  as  they  have  been
identifed  in economic  theory. The  third section  is a discussion  of the measures  of dispersion
used  in the analysis.  In the fourttr section  we review  otr  list of regressors.  The ernpirical
model  and  zubsequent  arnlyses  are  presented  in the fifth and  sixth sectiong  and  we provide
concluding  rernarks  in the  final  section.
Sources  of Price  Dispenion
Numerous  origins  of price  dispersion  have  been  identified  in tle  economic  lit€rature.
Most often zuch  dispersion  is attributed  to price discrimination  that is strongly  indicative  of
either  monopoly  or considerable  nn*et  power. However,  it is also  posible tlut  dispersion
occ1m  over  a perid of time  (as  may  be  the  case  for our quarterly  data)  and  may  be attributed
to Edgeworth  cycles. Another prominent  e><planation  $erns from the peak load pricing
literaure. Such  a stratery  is used  to smooth  the  utilization  of very  e4ensive  capital  equipmenr
over time and reduce  mngestion. Further,  price differentials  can be associated  with cost
ditrerentials.  The focus of this study  is to find evidence  of either price discrimination  or
Edgeworth  cycles  as  diclntomous  erslanations  that  cannot  be  directly  observed  with quarterly
dat4 while  corfrolling  for both  peak  load  effects  and  cost  differentials.
It seerns  paradoxical  that  both  non-competitive  and  competitive  forces  can  lead  to price
dispersion.  Coruider  fir*  non-competitive,  or planned  price  dispersion.  Cuslomers  may  be
charged  differing  prices  when  the seller  has  srfrcient infonnation  concerning  the cu$omer's
marginal  utilities. This  trpe of price  dispersion  may  be part of a firm's carefirlly  orchestrated
plan to mrurimize  profits vis-i-vis price discrimination.  Because  some  airlines  continrously
update  prices  offere4 we aryect that some  rcutes  may  be ctraracterized  by frst  or second
degree  discrimirution On  tlese rotrtes,  it is likely that  business  and  pleasre travelers  can  be
distinguishd  and each  group will be charged  unique  prices. Such  plarmed  price dispersion
would  be  associated  with more  concentraled  markets  and  hub  dominant  carriers.
Conversely,  price  dispenion  may  be unplanned  when  competition  drives  prices  down
over a period  of time. Given  the quarterly  nature  of airline  price dat4 it is conceivable  that
differing  prices  are  actually  a reflection  of competitive  forces  seeking  an equilibrium  price  in a
higtrly volatile market.  If  airlines  attempt  to  collude  tacitlv by holding  prices above  theHayes  atd  Rossl  Page  4
competitive  lwet  but lack sufrcient  market  power  to sr$ain those  prices,  a possible  resull
could  be Edgeworth  cycles. Such  cycles  oco.r when  collusive  an"ngements  are weak and
periodically  dissolve  into srccessive  price  orts until maxginal  co$ is reached,  then  prices  setde
for a finite  period  of time. The  cycle  is over  u,hen  one  carrier  relents  and  others  follow its lead
back  to the  collusive  level. Given  the  proliferation  offrre wars  over  the past  few years,  casral
empiricism  $ggests  that such  cycles  may  be at the root of price dispersion  in this industry.
This  dispersion  would occur  over  a perid oftime and  is not directly  observ'able  with quarterly
data. Howwer, cycles  could be detected  u  post tf tlrcy were properly  attribtlted  to more
competitive  routeg lower average  prices  pr regional  competition. Figure I  er<emplifies  the
eldr€me  variation  in price  the  data  exhibits  for many  routes  in our sample.
Given the multiproduct  natre  of ttrc aidine industry  with significant  rrultimarket
contact,  price dispersion  could resrlt from various profit ma;<imizing  srrategies. These
$rategies  may  vary not only across  markets  but also  tlnotrgh  time. Furthermore,  as overall
profitability  ofthe industry  has  declined  during  our sample  period we believe  that the variety
and  intensity  ofproft  mardmizing  efforts  may  have  changed  dramatically.  Our  unique  data  sa
perrnits  us  to distinguish  between  these  non-competitive  ard competitive  markets  and  to weigh
the  importance  ofvarious  strategies  undertaken  by the  nr4ior  caniers.
Measuring  Pricc Dispersion
The measurement  of inequality  has  a rich hisory in the economic  literature  with the
bulk ofit pertaining  to the  evaluation  ofincome  inequality.  Similarly,  the  dispersion  ofprices  is
ur o<ample  of price  inequality  which  may  be quantified  into an  indor  just as  incorne  inequality
may.  Given the vast number  of available  indiceq it  is appropriate  to  comment  on the
differences  between  the  indices  tlat are  relerrant  to this  sf,rdy.
The  relative  importance  ofvarious  indor properties  has  creatd a lengthy  debate.  For
making  policy decisions  regarding  income  inequality,  tlre choice  of an  indsc  may  be the renrll
ofa  prefererrce  for a particular  prop€rty  (Atkinsoq 1970). For  the dispersion  of
ticket  priceq  these  properties  are  less  important.  Moreover,  their  rankings  are  often  consistenlHayes  md  Rossl  Page  5
with each  ottrer  @asmanq  tlayes  and  Slottje,  1994).5  It is useful  to incorporate  more  tlan one
mea$[e of dispersion  into our study,  not to rerank our dependent  variable,  but merely  to
verifi the  robustness  of our resrlts  to the  type  of index  used.  In a similar  sense,  Kwoka  (1985)
demonstrated  that various  corrcentration  measureq  which were higlrly conelated exltibited
differences  in their  explanatory  power  when  used  in regresion  analysis.
In the  statistical  analysis  below,  we estimate  our model  with three  different  measures  of
price  dispersion  (the  Gini the Atkinson  inequality  measre and  the entropy  measre). While
most  res ts from the statistical  model  below  are  mnsistent  across  inderq  we find cases  where
ttrcy are notably diferent.  Emphasizing  different portions of  the price distrfuution  is
enlightening  for identi$ing  the  impact  ofpeak  load  pricing  strategies,  r€ional competitio4  and
canier effects. This analysis  validates  the usefulness  of rmrltiple  indices  urd highliglns  the
ocistence  of some  anomalies  in this indu*ry.  At the same  timg il brings  into question  the
amount  of faith  that  can  be  placed  on any  analysis  thar  is limited  to a single  inequality  meas.re.
With this  in mind"  we rwiew ttre  Gini,  the  AtkinsorL  and  the  entropy.
The  Gini coefrcient  tends  to give  more  weiglrt  to the middle  portion  of a distribution
an4 therefore  is rather  insensitive  to the  tails  of tlre  disribution. Wrile the  Gini coefficient  is a
well established  inderq  the  others  we  use  are  less  common.  Ttre  A*in:son  (1970)  measure  is an
axiomatically  based  indo<  bound  by zero  and  one. The  firnctiorxal  form  oftlis  indo<  is
(l)
where  r is the  number  ofobservations,  pr is  the  price  ofobservation  t; I  is the mean  price  and  e
is a choice  pararneter.  Unlike  the  Gini,  the  pararneter  6 allows  the  meastrer  to alter  the  portion
ofthe distribution  that  is emphasized.  For example  a large  a would  ernphasize  inequality  in the
lower  end  of the distribution  whereas  a small  a would  create  an  index  tlrat  is more  sensitive  to
inequality  in the upper  end  of the distribution.  We chose  an s of 0.5 which  is relatively  snrall
tf'his is a reinforcement  of an  index's  validity. Ifa new  index  were  to revers€  rankings  on  I large  scale,  it
would  not  likely  be  accepted.  When  a  largs  class  ofindices  will yield  similar  rankings  while  providing
different  typ€s  of inforuEtion,  &en those  indices  are  valuable  in a colleclive  sense.
_  _l
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and  will be  sensitive  to variations  in "hig['  prices.  Thereforg  the  regressions  with an  Atkinson
dependent  variable  should  be  partiarlady  informative  about  diryersion  above  the average  price
and  its relationstrip  with maftet power. The other  indor we utilize is the entropy  measure
which  is based  in information  theory. The  functional  form  of the  entropy  is
a) I =r 2P' 6P'
npp
The  entropy  index  is more  sensitive  to variation  in prices  at  the  lower  end  ofthe distribution.6
Chancterizing Price  Dispersion
Given the numerous  sources  of price dispersion  that have been  addressed  in the
economic  literaturq  a plethora  of variables  must  be included  in any  anpirical  model  designed
to idurtifr the importance  of eitlrer  market  power  or competition.  For this reason,  we have
identified  several  broad  categories  ofvariables  that  comprise  a lengthy  list ofregressors  for our
statistical  model. First we include  several  commonly  used  indicaton  ofmarket concentration
and  market  power. Second,  we have  a rurnb€r  of variables  that desffibe  the nahre of the
competitive  sihration  on a given  route. For er<amplg  we identifi competition  from a bankrupt
or a failed  carier, from Soutlwest  Airlines,  from other  airports  in the regio4 etc. Third,  we
control  for cost differentials  to some  e)dent  and  peak  load pncing. Fourtb we have  canier
dummies  to absorb  the  impact  of difiering  strategies  among  the  various  players  in this marka.
Finally,  we have  included  a vari*y  of interaction  terms  b€caus€  many  of our independent
variables  may  have  implications  for rnore  than  one  category.  These  rariables  are  regressed  on
our mearur€s  of price  dispersion  for 1332  quarterly  caniohoute observations.  The  data  set  is
a  balanced  panel  for eleven  quarters  zuch  tlat our pooled  sample  has  14,652  observations.T
Market  Power  Variables
u AJl  tlo"" of tl*""  measur€s  arc  rymmetrig  replication  inrrariant  and  scale  invarianr
?  Only route/carrier observations  thnt appear  in both data  sources  for all time periods  ale
induded.Hayes  and Rossl  PageT
We wish to  idenri$r  the odent to which market power is associated  with price
dispersion.  While  it has  been  argued  by Lott and  Roberts  that  these  price  differentials  can  be
attributed  to peak  load pricing  and  cost difffences, Borenstfi  and  Rose  formd  evidence  of
price  discrimination  among  monopolisticly  competitive  carriers. Given  the dramatic  changes
that have  occuned  in the airlines  since  the mid 1980s,  we srggest  that  it is appropriate  to r+
o<amine  tlis question  in liglrt of our more  cuffent  data.
To address  the issre of price discriminatioq  our dala set  includes  variables  that are
indicative  of market  power. We have  included  concentration  variablesr  RIERF and  AFIERF,
which  are  Herfndalrls  for the  route  and  the avrrage  ofthe endpoints  respectively.s  Borenstein
(1989)  finds  evidence  that aidines  have  greater  market  power  at lheir own hubs. Conversely,
economies  of scale  may  erist at hub  operations  due  to airport  dominance.  Therefore,  our hub
indicator,  HUB (a dummy  variable  that signifies  a hub at eitlnr endpoint  of a route) could
captrre  both  market  power  and  cost  savings.  To decipher  these  two effectq  we interact  HUB
with RIfERF,  AHERF  ard NUMCARR  (the  number  of caniers  servirg  a route). We consider
these  interaction  terms  to be  indicators  of the  market  power  associated  with hubs  (the  effoct  of
the last one being negative)  and the remaining  'hub' etrect  to be associated  with a cost
ditrerential. Thus,  we include  HUB in our cost car€gory.  Since  there  often is a rnarked
difference  between  rhe price of oneway urd round-fip fares,  we also include  ROUND, a
percentage  of round  trip tickets. As in the  case  ofHUB, ROUND may  also  bave  a dual  effect.
Since  round-trip  frres are  often  discounted  only  ifttrey include  a Saturday  nighr  stay  (and  may
require  even  nrore  rcstrictions  than  thatl ROLJND  may  also  be a strong  proxy  for p€ak  load
prictug.  fuain,  we interact  ROUND with RIIERF, AHERF, NUMCARR and HUB to
capure  that  aspect  which  is associated  with market  powr.  The  ROUND variable  is included
with the  peak  load  pmxies.  Finally,  we susp€ct  that  average  price,  MEAN, should  be  higher  if
market  power  is prevalent.  Therefore,  we interact  MEAII with RHERF,  AIIERF and  HUB to
identify  price  shength  ofmarket  power.
Competitive  Forces
I Since  we suspect  that there  is a potential  for endog€neity,  we instrument  these  variables.Hryes and RosslPageB
In contmst  to a price discrimination  story Edgeworth  cycling  can also cfieate  price
dispersion.  To fnd evidence  of such  behavior,  we incorporale  a number  of 'competition"
variable.s  into our data  set. Firsl we consider  competition  from other  carriers. For o<amplg
we wish to  fil€a.$Ire  the impact of competition  from a bankrupt  carrier.  Further, it  is
notewortlry  that competition  may  occur  on a route  that is traveled  by two carriers  or it may
occur  on a route  that originates  from a competing  airport. For examplg  tle New York City
area has numerous  competing  airports as does Los Angeles.  Given the many large
metropolitan  areas  in the United States  with such  regional  competitiorl  we have  rededned  an
endpofurt  to include  airports  in close  proximity  to each  other. Thereforg  COMPBAIT{K  is a
dummy  variable  tttat indicates  eith€r  direct  or regional  competition  from a banlrupt carrier
Similarly,  COMPFAIL and COMPSW  are dummy  variables  that indicate  eitlre.r  direct or
'regional competition  from  a  subsequently  friled  carrier or  from  Southwest  Airlineq
respectively.  We also  consider  the overall  impac't  of regional  conrpetition  on price  dispersion.
We  include  dummy  variables  for flights  with €ndpoints  in the  Chicago  area"  the  Dallas  are4  the
Denver area,  the Detroit area,  the Houston arca"  tlte Los Angeles  area,  tlrc Charlotte
Greanvillg  SC areq llre New York City area,  the San  Frarcisco  area,  and  the Washingtoq
D.C. area. These  dummy  variables  are signified  by REGIONYY (where  'Yll'  siguifies  the
endpofurt).  Finally,  we include  the nurnber  of carriers,  NIIMCAR&  serving  a route as an
indicator  ofheavy  competition.  Positive  coefficients  on these  variables  would be indicative  of
competitive  forces  driving  price  dispersion  and  evidence  that  market  power  has  been  eroded  ir
this  indusry since  the  mid 1980s.
Peak  Inad hicing
Lott  and Roberts  have argued  that the airlfures  use price dispersion  to  alleviate
mngestion  ar peak  usage  times. For oramplg  to get a discounted  fare,  uually a consumer
must  book a rourd trip flight and  include  a Saturday  night  in his  travel  plans  as  airports  tetld  to
be  less  busy  on the  weekends.  For this  reasoq  we consider  the percentage  of round-trip  fares
(ROUND) to proxy peak  load pricing. Moreover,  we argue  that peak  load pricing  is more
likely to be practiced  on routes  wlrere  there  is a higher  variance  in load frctors (LWOADF)
and  plane  sizes  (LTfPSIZE). However,  since  we suspect  a simulteneity  problern  with theseHuyes  md RosslPage9
vaxiableq  they are lagged  one period.  We also interact these  t€rms with  each other,
PSZLOAD.
Cost  Dfferentials
We irrclude  t}nee  variables  to control  for routes  tbat  will have  significant  differences  in
costs. These  variables  are  DIST, the  length  of a direct  Aighq  HUB, since  we belierre  that  lubs
repres€nt  a cost saving  to the hub operating  canier;  and  STOP. STOP  is the pocentage  of
pass€ngers  that er+erience  a stopov€r  somewtrcre.  Since  this may include  any number  of
intermediate  airportq there is the possibility  of various  cost differentials  arising  from zuch
stopovers.
Carrier  Dummies
Finally,  we include  carrier  dummies  for 13  regional  and  national  caniers.
The Statistical  ModeJ
Given  the enormity  of our data  seq  we are  able  to include  a large  number  of variables
in our analysis.  The variables  reflect  the theoraically  based  sources  of price dispersion  as
presented  in the second  section:  price discrimination,  competitive  discormtig; peak load
pricing urd co* differarials. The  model  we estimale  is as  follows:
DI SPr,  = d + 6  tRH  ERFijt  + 6, AH  ERF,, + 6  3HUB  RHERF{I  + 6  oH  WAHERF*
+ 6  sHWNUMCAut + 6 uRO  _RHERFT,  + 6.,  RO  _ AHERF|,
+ 6 sRO  - NUMC  ilt + 6 nRO  _ HUB  r, + 6.,,MRHERF*
+  D..MAHERF,,  + 6rrMHW*
+ pTCOMPBANK,,  + pTCOMPFAIL,,  + pTCOMPSW,
+ p  o  NUMC  ARR,  + Z e 
" 
nzuot'twa
+ y BOUND ilt + y, LWOADF,, + y, LVP  SIZE  T,  + y  o  P  SIZLOAD  *
+  BpISI+ B2HW.+  P,STOP,,
+l  qTCARNERfl{  o,,  +eit+ni +w,
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The  equation  is estimated  with the Gini log odds  ratio, the Atkinson  log odds  ratio
and the Entropy index as the dependent  variable.  The daa anployed irrcludes  fi:fteen
carriers  traveling  on 973  routes  from  the  frst quarter  of 1990  tlrough the  4th quarter  of 1992.e
The data  set  is a balanced  panel  G.e.  each  carrier  on each  route  is represented  for every  time
period  in the sample).  We estimate  the model  with random  time and  routdcarrier  effects.  As
several  variables  were lagged  to reduce  sifiulteneity  bias,  the observations  in tlre regression
begin  with the second  quarter  of 1990,  providing  1l  time periods  ail  14,652  observations.
Given  the time series  nature  of the data the error structure  irrcludes  an moving  average  (1)
process  to control  for autocorrelation.  The  model  is estimated  using  genemlized  least  squares
with two-way  random  efects. The  appendices  contain  a detailed  description  of the data  and
tlre  variables.
The  regressors  are  ananged  by type  in equation  (3). The 5 variable  denote  indicators
of martet power such  that a positive  coefrcient  would suggest  price  discrimination The p
variables  denote  variables  regarding  various  types  of competition  that could potutially force
carriers  to dismunt frres and  the d variables  denote  endpoints  at various  multiple  airport
regions. Accordingly,  positive  coefficients  should  be indicative  of Edgeworth  cycting  b5'
carriers  that are not able  to maintain  collusive  price lwels.  The 7 and  B variables  denote
proxies  for peak load pricing and cost differentialg  respectively. And 6nal1y,  p denotes
individual  carrier  effects.
Results  fiom the Statistical  Modd
Simple  correlation  tests  among  the independent  variables  were  fust mnducted  to red
flag  any  unexpected  mutticollinearity  problerrs.  While  the  correlatiors  were  not strong  €nough
to create  ulch problems,  some  ofthe resrlts  from the correlation  were urlightening.  By and
large,  most  carriers  are  somewhat  correlued  with other  carriers  having  conelation  coefficients
between  0.2 and 0.5.  In particular,  Aloha Airlines  and  llawaiian Airlines  have  correlation
coefficients  of 0.438,  and  Northwest  Airlines  and  Trans  World Airlines  have  correlations  of
0.431. Such  corre.lations  strongly  indicat€  muhimartet  contact  arnorg  tle major  and  regional
9  This  is in cont  art  to  Bo{€nstein  ald Rose  who  use  521  routes  and  l l carriers.Hryes md  RosslPagell,
caniers  (see  Evans  ard Kessides,  1994)-  What  is more  astounding  is the degree  to wttich  the
number  of caniers  serving  a routg NUMCAR&  is correlated  with c€rtain  caniers. The
caniers  most  closely  associated  with NLJMCARR  are  Continental  Airlines,  Northweq TWA
and  United  Airlines  all with corre.lation  coeffioienls  above  0.5. With the er<ception  of Unite4
these  carriers  have  had  severe  financial  dificulties  during  tlris  time  period  with both  Continental
and  TWA declaring  bankruptcy  and  Northwest  fiequently  on the  brink of bankruptcy.  In fact
route competition  from banknrpt  caniers  and  NLMCARR have  a oorrelation  coefficient  of
0.565,  denronstrating  firther that bankrupt  carriers  are closely  associated  with routes  that
er+erience  heavy  competition.to  While  the other  carriers  in the sample  seem  to have  a large
selection  of routes  that  they  tend  to domirutg these  caniers  do not. Possessing  some  routes
without heary  compaition  is irnportant  for maintaining  a competitive  edge. And finally,  we
fnd tlnt ROIIND is negatively  correlated  with COMPSW highlighing  the commuter-flight
nature  ofthis very  successflrl  airline.
The estimuion  resrlts from (3) are presented  in Table 2 which reports  the GLS
coefficients  and  their marginal  probabilities  for all three  measres  of price  dispersion.rr  The
fitted values  for RHERF  ard AHERF  dernonstrate  that  RHEF$ is endogenous  while  AHERF
is not.
Market  Power
We find no conclusive  evidence  of price  discrimination.  The  coeffcients  for RHEM,
AHERF,  HUBAIIERF, HUBRHEM and  MRHEM  are  insignificant.  Further,  a rnrnber  of
tlre  interaction  terrns,  which  are  designed  to capture  the  price  discrimination  in ROUND,  HLIB,
and  MEAN, are  not consi*ently  significant.  The  only  robust  rezuhs  we obtain  from our price
discrimination  proxies  are  from  RO_AIIERF  which  is negative  and  significant  for all measures
of price  dispersion.  This s.rgge$s  that at sma[  erdpoints,  less  price diqpersion
exists  on round  trip flights. Since  this  is where  carriers  have  the most  potential  to ercploit  their
ro  llayes and  Ross  (forthcoming)  find tbat while there  v/ere  notable  changes  in market  sEuctue following
the d€parhres  ofEastertr Airlines and  Midway Airlines in the eady 1990's,  there  were  not unusualy larye
changas  in the mix of routes  offered  by tbe industry. This may  indicate  tbat tbese  two carriers  became
insoh€  simply b€cause  they could not effectively  carve  tlpir  own niche in the market  place-
t tRecall  rt'ot tle Gioi enrphasizal  fhe  niddle dthe <[sfrihtion, the  Atkiruoq rhe  rry,per  €nd  and  l]e entrw,
the  lower  end.Hayes  and RosslPagel2
market  powc, and  they  appear  to opt for more  rmiform  prices  rather  than  dtsperse  oneg we
argue  tlnt pric€  discrimination  is not  tleir strategi  of choice  for profit maximization.
Competition
The most  infornrative  resrlts  are  those  related  to the competition  variables.  Caniers
with a failed  carrier  failed  during  our sample  period  exhibit  less  diqperse  prioes,
whereas  conrpetition  from a carrier  ttrat  declared  bankuptry but continued  to op€rate  has  no
significant  etrec't.  Financially  strained  carriers  that zurvive  price  differently  from those  that do
not. Competition  from Southwes  Airlines  strongly  indicates  more  uniform  pricing. Southwest
remarkably  impacts  the  pricing  patterns  ofother caniers.
The dummy  variables  for naltiple airport regions  are by and large positive and
significant. The notable  er<ceptions  are  the Detroit and  Washingto4  D. C. areas  which are
negative  and  significant,  and  the  New York area  where  the lower  end  ofthe distribution  is not
sensitive  to eldra  competition  from  competing  airports.  In these  areas  where  there  is both  intra
and interairport  competitiorL  dispersion  is more prevalent  which demonstrates  the role of
competitive  forces  in spreading  prices  down  the  demand  curve.
Moreover,  MEAN Ooth the  first and  second  order  effects)  is negative  and  significant
danonstrating  that prices  af,e  more  disperse  when  the average  is lower.  This result  is our
strongest  eviderrce  that  pric€  dispersion  result  from  lesq  ratlrer  than  more,  market  power.
Collecrively,  the  market  power  and  competition  resdts  zuggest  that  competitive  forceg
rather  than  carefrrl  planning  are  at  the heart  of price  dispersion.  Howwer, if that competition
comes  fiom Southwest  or some  carrier  that is on its way out, there  is also  the possibility  of
uniform pricing.  tlgh  uniform prices  seem  to be associated  with market  power at small
monopolized  endpoints. Nonuniform  priceq howwer, seem  to  be the res'rlt of  healthy
competition  fiom solvent  oligopolists.  This  point  brings  us  back  to our quarterly  dafa  problem.
Many of our re*rlts point to dispersion  as a ree;lt of competitive  forces  among  oligopolists
who  unsrccessfi:lly  attempt  to zustain  prices  above  nurginal  cost. The  marke seems  to be  in a
constant  state  ofvolatility which  is reflective  ofEdgeworth  cycles  in airline  markas.
Peak  Inad PricinqHoyes  ard Rossl  Page73
Our  conjecfire  that  dispersion  may  be  an  overt  afi€rnpt  by the airlines  to redired  faffc
to less  mngested  time slots  lns gaind some  validation  from these  e$imations.  We find thar
ROLIND is a mnsistently  sigrrificant  and positive  indicator  of diqpersion  for all measures.
Since  we have  removed  nnrch  ofthe price  discrimination  tlat is exercised  through  round  trip
tickets  by utilizing interaction  tennq ROLJND  in isolation  becomes  a proxy for peak load
pricing. Howwer, our other  proxies  are  less  conclusive.
Cost  Differences
We find limited  evidence  that  price  dispersion  is *re result  of cost  differences.  HUB is
not robust.  This clearly  reputes  a cost distinction  based  upon savings  from lnrbs as an
erplanation  for dispersion  However,  we note  that  DIST is positive  and  significant  for the  Gini
and  t}e entropy  measure,  whereas  it is insignificant  for the  Atkinson Recall  that  the  Atkinson
indo<  givas  greater  weight  to the upper  end  of the price distributioq  indicating  that inelastic
demand  is not sensitive  to stage  length. Those  travelers  who anive  at  tlrc terrninal  and  b'uy  last
minute  tickets  pay t}e same  price  if tlrey are  going 30O  miles  or 3000 miles.  Convosdy,
STOP  is consistently  positive  and  higtrly  significant  for all measures  of dispersion.  This  rerult
*rggests  that caniers  with more  direct  flights  have  less  variation  in their  prices,  while  carriers
with many  stopovers,  and  consequently  more  variety  in their flight costs,  have  greater  price
variation.
Canier  Etrects
We are  partio:lady  interested  in the  impact  of Southwest  Airlines  on their  competitor's
pricing  strategies;  however,  our results  are not uniform. While Southwest  has  a renrarkable
impact  on the lower end  of the price  distribution  (as  indicated  by its significant  and  negative
coefrcient  on lhe entropy  index) it does  not seem  to affect  the middle  or upp€r  end  of the
distribution.  Soutlwest  clearly  caters  to a differ€rrt  crowd  than  do its competitors.
Conclusions
Extraordinary  price dispersion  in the airline  induSry contirues  to p€rsist  -  largely
stemming  from mmpetitive  forces  that  are  not likely  to gJbside  in th€ near  fi.rture.  We fnd noHayes  and Ross/Pagel{
conchrsive  evidence  that price  dispersion  during  the early  1990s  is the res:lt of market  power
or price discrimination  price dispersion  is most closely  associated  with a lower
average  price, strongly  srggesting  t}at competition  forces  prices  dowq rather  t}an marke
power  being  used  to exploit  inelastic  demand.  Cost  differences  and  peak  load  pricing  schernes
do contribute  to dispersed  prices  in a limited  frshion;  howerrer,  it seems  undeniable  that pric€
dispersion  is closely  tied to dpamic oligopoly  forces. Oligopolist  cariers make  consistendy
unsuccessfi.rl  atternpts  to collude  tacitly. Such  friled collusion  is theoretically  based  in poot
market  conditions  which were untamount  in the early 1990s.r2  As aidines  became  more
concemed  with streanrlining  costs,  maintaining  large  networkq and retaining  their customet
bases  through  frequent  flier prograrng  the tension  between  traditional  route dominance  and
heightened  mmpetition came to  a head.  Wlile  this period of  transition is financially
devastating  to most cariers, it is a heyday  for consumers.  Howwer, recent  tends toward
more favorable  market  conditions  may gradually  lead to  a more consistent  ex post pice
di*ribution at a  higher  equilibrium  price.
To provide  additional  verification  of our re$lts, we estimated  our mdel  with three
different  but highly  correlatd meau:res  ofdispersion.  We  fnd tlat most  results  are  robust  to
our selection  of indiceq  although  some  differerrces  arise.  While  tlrere  are  a few changes  of sign
in our variable  coefficients,  differenc€s  often  exist  in the  sigrrificance  levels  ofthose  coefficients.
This  difference  s.rggests  that  resrlts  from  a single  ind€r(  miglt be  misleading  or incornplete.
In comparison  to the Borenstein  and Rose,  we find much less evidence  of price
discrimination  in the early  1990s  than  in their sample  period  of 1986. This  difference  is likely
due to financial  *rain in the latter perio4 the resulting  de{erioration  of tacit collusioq and
insufficient  knowledge  of appropriate  equilibrium  pricing  strategies.
t'?  See  Green  and Poder (1984).Hryes and Rox/Pagel5
Appendix A - Date
Since  the airline  indu$ry is still zubject  to  some  regulation  by the Department  of
Transportation  @OT), the acomulation  of data  continues  on a vef,y  srtensive  scale. The
Origin srd Destirdiur,9nrrey @atabank  1A or DBIA)  includes  price  and  sage information
while the TI(N Donestic kgnent  hta  @ar;abffik  28DS or T100) gives information  on
capacity  and  the utilization  thereof  and  frequency  of service. These  databanks  are available
from the Volpe National Transportation  Systems  Center  in Carnbridge,  Md  or from the
National  Archives  in Washingtori  DC for older  data. The  DB1A is a random  lfflo survey  of
all tickets  ise.red  for flights  within the  United  States  and  is published  on a quarterly  basis.  The
Tl00 contains  data  reported  by US canien operating  non-stop  service  wit}in the  United  StaJes
and  is published  momhly.  The  following  types  of tickets  are  removed  from  tlre  mmple:
l)  Any ticket  with one  or more  segments  of firs class  travel  (with the exception  of Southwest
Airlineg  who reports  all  tickets  as  ftst class).
2)  Any tickets  that are  not either  one-way  or rormd-trip,  i.e. a trip such  as  DFW-CLE-LGA-
DFW @allas-Fort  Worth to Cleveland  ro LaGuardia  to Dallas-Fort  Worth) is a three  leg fip
which  does  not have  a clear  destination  and  is not included,  whereas,  DFW-LGA-LGA-DFW
does  and  is.
3) Any  tickets  with more  than  one  change  ofplane  per  direction  oftravel.
4) Tickets  with any  origin  or destination  outside  the  United  States.
5) Interline  tickets  (those  tickets  where  services  are  provided  by more  than  one  carrier).
6) Any tickets  that  were  less  than  $10  or greater  than  $750  each  way or $20  and  $15@  round-
trip, respectively,  as  these  are assumed  to be frequerf  flier ticketg chartered  flights or input
elTon.
There  are 1,332  carrier/route  observations  representing  973  routes  selected  from these
two data  sets  to use  for these  analysis.  These  are  the only carrier/route  combinations  that are
present  in both d^ta sets  for a// time periods  among  the top 100 airports  in the US and
represent  rougtrly  3tr4 of all itineraries  in the  DBIA  The  use  of the Tl00 somewhat  restricts
the  choice  set  of routes  since  it is a segnent  based  data  sourc€.  For an  observation  to occur  on
ttrc T100,  there  narst  be a non-stop  flight between  the endpoints.  Conversely,  the DB1A has
observations  on almost  any  combination  of segrnants  imaginable  between  various  endpoints.  It
should  be noted  that inconsistencies  in the interpretation  of the variables  extracted  from these
data  sets  rnay  arise  given  their  differences.
The most recent 12 quarters  of data were used  for the analysis  (1990:1  through
1992:4). T"lre  equations  below  were  estimated  by observations  *rat are aggregated  by route
pair  and  time. Wth the inclusion  of some  lagged  variables,  tlris  leaves  1  1 data  points  for each
of the 1,332  observations  resr.rlting  in 14,652  observations  in total.  A route is coded  by the
alphabetical  order  ofthe endpoirns  (i.e.  DFW-LGA  and  LGA-DFW  are  both  DFWLGA and  alL
data  pertaining  to these  ardpoints  arc aggregated  into at least  one  carrier  observation  in each
quarter).Hayes  ard Rossl  Page16
Appendk B - Variable Definitions
Dependent  Variables
D/SP Three  measres  of dispersion  are  utilized  in our model. The  Atkinson  meanre  with a
parameter  of0.5, the Gini ard the entropy  index  are  ernployed.  However,  the Atkinson  and
the Gini lie between  zso  and  ong creating  a limited dependent  variable  problern. Two
alternatives  are urggested  for accommodating  a limitrd dependent  variable. One is to use
Tobit maximum  likelitrood  e$imation  rather  than  least  squares.  Since  the entropy  inde,x  is not
bound and least squares  esimation is possible,  we prefer a method that allows for  a
homogeneous  estimation  technique.  The second  alternativg which does allow  srch
homogeneity,  is  to conv€rt  lhe Atkinson  and  the  Gini to unbound  variables  by caladating  their
log odds  rarios. The  log odds  ratio ofx  equals  ln x{l-x)  and  is not bound  as  is the original
variable.
Independent  Variables
Market  Power  variables  with d'coefrcients:
RHEEFI.  Tllr-  HH index  (EJJ  of the route,  &  is the proportion  of passengers  an airline  a
serves  on  the  rouG. Source:  DB I A and  author's  calculations.
MKISHARE This  is the  market  share  ofthe carrier  for the  peliod  and  route  in the  observation.
This  variable  is used  as  an  instrument  for RIIERF since  it is likely  to be endogenous.  Source:
DBIA
AEEIIF:  (AHERFI+AHERF2V2.  Wtwe AHERFI is ttre  f/Il  indo<  (XJ")  of the airport  firsl
listed  in the route  pair,  S, is the proportion  of pass€ngers  an  airline  a serves  at the airport  and
AHFRF2  is the  I/l/  index  ofthe airport  listed  second  in the route  pair,  S, is the proportion  of
passengers  an  airline  a serves  al the  airport. Source:  DBIA and  author's  calq ations
ffiCHED  This is a count  of the number  of scheduled  non-stop  flights  in the quarter. This
variable  is  used  to inslrument  IHERF which  may  be  endogenous.  Sourc€:  T100.
HWRHRF  This  is an  interaction  rerm  with the hub  indicator  and  RHERF. Source:  DBIA
and  Bauer  (1992)
HWAHERF  This  is an  interaction  term  with the hub  indicator  ad  AHERF. Source:  DBIA
and  Bauer  (1992)
HWNUMCA  This is an interaction  term with the lnrb irdicator and  NUMCARR Sorxc'e:
DBIA and  Bauer  (1992)
RO_RHERF  This  is an  interaction  term  with ROtliD  (described  below)  and  RI1ERE Source
DBIAHryes atd Rossl  Page77
RO_AHRF This  is an  interaction  term  with ^RO{/}D  (described  below)  and  AIIERE Source:
DBlA
RO_INUMC  This is an interaction  term with ROUND (descnbed  below) and  NUMCARR
Source:  DB1A
RO_HW  This is an interaction  term with ROUND (described  below) and  HW.  Sorxoe:
DBIA and  Barcr  (1992).
MRHERF This is an interaction  tqm wilh MEAN (described  below)  and,RHERE Source:
DBIA
MAHFRF  This is an interaction  terlll.  \\irh MEAN (described  below) and  RIIERE. Source:
DBlA
MHW  Thts is an interaction  term with MHN  (desctillrd  below) and ^RI/ERE Source:
DBlA and  Bauer  (1992)
Conrpetition  variables  with p coe,ficients:
NUMCARR  This is a cormt of the nunrber  of caniers  serving  a route during tlte period.
Source:  DBIA
COMPBANK  This  is a 0/1 dummy  variable  which  indicates  tlat a bankupt carrier  flies  on the
route  or on a regionally  competing  route. Competition  Aom  bankrupt  carriers  slrotrld  be more
intense  than  from otler cerriers.  Source:  DBIA
COMPFAIL This is a 0/l  dummy  variable  which indicares  fiat  an airlines  which has  since
failed  flies on the route  or on a regionally  rotrte. Competition  from ubsequently
failed  carriers  should  be  more  intense  tlan from other  carriers.  Source:  DB I A
COMPSW  This  is a 0/l  dummy  variable  which  indicat€s  that Southwest  Airlines  flies  on the
route or on a regionally  competing  route. We enpect  Southwest  to be associated  with les
dispersion.  Source:  DBIA
I,fl,4.1[ This  is  the  mean  price  a carrier  charges  on a route. Source:  DB I A
Regional  dummies  with d coefficients:
RrcIONW  This is a dummy  variable  indicating  that the obsewations  has at least one
endpoint  in a  multiple  airport  region:  Chicsgo,  Dailas,  Denv€r,  Detroiq  Hou$or1  Los Angele.q
Cbadotte NC, New Yod< City, San  Francisco,  or Washingtoq  DC.  In these  caseg  tlte
qrstomer  has  not only  a choice  ofcarrier  but also  a choice  ofairport.Hryes and RosslPage  18
Peak  load  variables  with Tcoefficients:
ROUND This  is  the  percent  of passengers  flying  round  trip on a  route. Sowce: DB  1  A
WOADF This  is a  variance  of LOADF (loadfanor) lagged  one  period  which  is the  percent  of
available  seats  occrrpied  on nonsop flights. This  variable  represents  the variation  in aitpla"e
occupancy.  Source:  Tl0O
WSIZE  T:hrs  is a variance  of plane  sizes  (as indicatd by the number  of seats  on a plane)
lagged  one  period. Source:  Tl00
PilZLOAD  This  is an  interaction  tqmfor  VLOADF  afiWSIn.  Source:  Tl00
Cost  variables  with p coefficiurts:
DIST T"lE  great  circle  distanc€  (divided  by one  thousand  to adjust  the scale)  in official  statute
miles  between  lhe origin  and  destination  of airports. A prediction  of how this  variable  should
affect  an  airline's  ability  to collude  is not c€rtain.  Source:  Tl00
HW  A0ll  dummy  variable  indicating  that one  or botl endpoints  of a route  are  major  hubs
for at leas one  airport. Source:  Bauer  (1992)
SZOP This is the percrnt  of passengers  o<periencing  a change  of planes  and  indicates  tlrat a
route  is starting  or ending  at a "non-huo"'  airport. Source:  DBIA
Carrier  dummie,s  with g coefficients:
CARNERfi{  There  are  dummy  variables  included  for fourteen  of t}e fifteen  carriers  included
in the sample;  American  Airlines,  Aloha  Airtineq Alaska  Airlineg Continental  Airlineg Delta
Airlineg llawaiian Airlines,  America  Wesl Northwest  Airlineq Trump Sluttlq  Trans  World
Airlineq United  Airlines,  and  USAir.  The default  airlines  not represented  wirh a dummy  are
two srnall  carriers,  Mdwest Express  and  Air Wisconsin.  Thereforg  all carrier  intercepts  are  in
comparison  to Southwest.Hayes  and RosslPage  19
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America  West  Airlines
Northwest  Airlines
Trump Shuttle
Trans  World Airlines
United Airlines
USAirTable  2



















































































'"Iag  odds  ratios  urere  taken  for tbe Gini and  Atkinson  becalse  they  arc  both  bould B  zero  ad  one,  therdty
crcating  a linit€d d€pedenl  rariable  issj€. As $E wish  to make  a dfu€ct  oonpdrison  (with identical  techniques)
betqresr  the  r€e{ts ofthese  meastres  and  t}e re$lts from th€  entropy  measlre,  w]ubh  is r|ot  boun4 ve









































































































































































































Continental  AirlinesTable  2 (cont'd)
Delta Airlines
Hawaiian  Airlines
America  West Airlines
Northwest  Aidines
Trump Shuttle




















































































Figure l.  The Cumulative  Distribution  of Prices  From lfghest to Lowest - DallaslFort
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